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Media policy always has been concerned with the exercise of media power. Regulatory 
frameworks are designed to ensure that, whatever power the media may have, it is 
exercised in a way that aligns with citizen and consumer interests. When the exercise of 
media power seems likely to reduce media plurality, is there a need for regulatory 
intervention? If yes, what evidence-base is needed? In an age when digital 
intermediaries are sitting at the very core a complex media ecology, how can policy 
makers ensure that media pluralism is maximised, albeit in line with other competing 
policy goals?  
 
The media ecology includes fixed and wireless access providers, search engines, video 
streaming services, webhosts, and blog platforms, social media providers, and payment 
systems. The top 10 websites in the UK in 2014 included Google with 88% of the search 
market (94% for mobile search), YouTube, Facebook, eBay, BBC, Yahoo!, Twitter, and 
Amazon, among others. In addition to search, they support content aggregation and their 
recommender systems rely on the processing user-generated data. These companies 
operate as market makers or orchestrators - as intermediaries - in the digital media 
value chain. They sometimes function explicitly as gatekeepers to digital content and 
information, blocking and filtering in line with their terms of service agreements or with 
state policy and regulation regarding data protection, copyright enforcement and 
surveillance. In other instances, their activities are anything but transparent.  
 
These companies are increasingly at the centre of everything we do and learn online. Of 
course the media ecology also includes incumbent newspaper and television/radio 
broadcaster organizations. In the UK, the regulator, Ofcom’s 2014 Digital Day study 
shows that total media and communication consumption has grown from over 8 hours 
of activity in 2010 to more than 11 hours in 2014.1 Depending on the age cohort and 
other socio-economic variables, increasing numbers of citizens are using the digital 
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intermediaries’ services to access a growing proportion of their total media 
consumption.  
 
The presence of these intermediaries in the everyday lives of citizens and consumers is 
raising major policy issues. Because they are increasingly prominent in the media 
ecology, digital intermediary responsibility and accountability are important 
considerations for policy makers especially when they are mandated to hold these 
companies to account if they are behaving badly. For instance, the European Parliament 
passed a non-binding measure in 2014 calling for the break-up of Google as a means of 
diluting its market power. Even if the Parliament does not have the power to enforce 
this measure, this indicates that intermediary practices can be inconsistent with policy 
goals. 
 
The digital intermediary challenge for policy makers 
There are many reasons that policy makers are finding it challenging to find effective 
means of addressing competitiveness issues and media plurality concerns. A major 
reason is the growing complexity of media production and consumption as activity shifts 
towards the internet. These companies are organised as platform organizations - 
companies that ‘squeeze themselves between traditional news companies and their two 
customer segments, the audience and the advertisers’.2 They benefit from substantial 
economies of scale and scope of operation. This enables them to exploit enormous 
information assets including databases and algorithms. A platform is basically ‘a 
reconfigurable base of compatible components on which firms and users build 
applications’.3 Platform intermediaries use profiling to segment customers – some 
offering free content, others, paid-for content, and still others, exposure to online 
advertising. A citizen’s search activities may result in referrals to content ‘properties’ 
through a variety of intermediary sharing arrangements that support targeted 
marketing and cross-selling. The platform owner’s interest is in aggregating content and 
shaping traffic flows ultimately to achieve profits and to command high visibility in the 
media marketplace ecology. Platform organisations are not new to industry, but when 
they are present in media and information markets, they raise many issues around how 
public policy should deal with them. 
 
Intermediaries innovate continuously to find ways of locking in or capturing those who 
visit their platforms using combinations of algorithms and human intervention. In the 
1990s ‘portal’ firms like Yahoo! looked for ways to control what users could do at their 
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sites and this lead to policy debates about the implications for privacy, freedom of 
expression, and access to diverse content. 4 The world has moved on and we now have 
open platforms, but the means of control over content gateways have not disappeared –
they have become more ubiquitous and less transparent than before.  
 
Today’s intermediaries often compete less on price than on the way people evaluate the 
quality of their services and they are in a position to exercise their market power when 
they achieve dominance in the market. The question is whether they use this power in a 
way that threatens citizen’s rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and access to 
diverse content. If their editorial or gatekeeping efforts diminish the quality or variety of 
content accessed by citizens, result in discriminatory treatment, or lead to unwanted 
surveillance, there is a prime facie case for policy oversight. Most of the media ecology 
intermediaries are commercial companies. They often claim they are neutral ‘conduits’ 
for traffic and hosts for content creators, but they are more than this. They have the 
power to influence what ideas citizens are able to find easily and whether the notion of a 
public sphere for democratic dialogue can be sustained into the future as the media 
ecology increases in complexity. 
 
The Market Dynamics of MultiSided Platforms 
In Europe and in the United States analysts are considering what these developments 
means for policy and regulation. Economists who study this class of business 
intermediary call them ‘multi-sided platforms’. These bring together two or more types 
of economic agents to facilitating interactions, theoretically making all agents better off 
by coordinating them through their affiliation agreements (see Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1: Multisided platforms vs Product Platforms and Resellers 
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Source: Hagiu5 
 
Search engine intermediaries, for instance, generate value for three groups: websites by 
indexing them and making them available through search queries, people who make 
queries, and advertisers who want to reach people. In this multisided configuration it is 
quite likely that a platform owner will choose to price at a level that is ‘higher than is 
socially desirable’ in some part of its platform business. This means there will be market 
failures in which social welfare is not maximized within the meaning ascribed to this by 
economists. Evans and Schmalensee say that ‘perfect markets’ are not plausible in these 
kinds of industries. These two leading economists who analyse these platforms, argue 
that ‘exclusive reliance on mechanical measures such as market share or price-cost 
margins in determining market power is not advisable’ in these situations. 6  
 
Policy makers ignore the complexity of these platforms at their peril. It is essential to 
have a means of understanding how actors on all sides of a platform are affected by 
intermediary strategies because indirect network effects really matter. Since 
economists’ results provide little certainty about whether policy intervention is called 
for in any given case, there can be a strong inclination to do nothing until the evidence of 
harm is incontrovertibly clear. Some argue that companies like Google, YouTube and 
Facebook may be near monopolists, but their status is only temporary. The current 
leaders may have superior technology and be the most innovative, but Schumpterian 
creative destruction is likely to topple them eventually; therefore, their strategies and 
practices cannot be deemed to be anticompetitive. 7 Regulatory intervention in hybrid 
heterogeneous networks with contractual alliances with the large platform companies 
might inhibit innovation. McKnight says the reality is one where: 
 
‘enterprises deliver digital services orchestrated in hybrid clouds on virtual 
machines, using software-defined networks and network function virtualization 
to enable firms to create, and tear down heterogeneous, policy-compliant 
servers and networks in an instant as users wish, whilst implementing Over the 
Virtual Top [services]’. 8 
 
Other economists say that companies like Google are not multisided players at all and 
that the ‘relevant’ market that should be of concern to policy makers is not search, but 
instead, the whole of the market for personal information in which Google is not 
evidently dominant. 9  
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The media ecology is said to be involved in a complex process of ‘platformization’.10 This 
awkward neologism aptly characterizes the media market with its tangled vertical and 
horizontal arrangements. Hybrid platforms are emerging with multiple intermediaries 
in their value chains. For some of these content control is not an issue, while, for others, 
it is. A platform provider might decide to privilege content produced by its affiliates in 
one business segment, but not in another, with a view to maximizing its overall profit 
margin.  
 
Reactive or Proactive Policy Makers? 
Policy makers could wait for economists and other analysts of these industry dynamics 
to agree among themselves, but they would have a long wait. And, it is not only the 
economists’ view of market dynamics and outcomes that is at stake. For instance, there 
is relatively little understanding of the subtle ways in which news production and access 
to content are influenced in the digital platform marketplace. Digital intermediaries 
promise an abundance of content for citizens and consumers. Policy makers sometimes 
seem entranced by the technical capacities of intermediaries to create, process and store 
vast quantities of digital content. It may be suggested that regulatory intervention is 
needed only if there is unambiguous evidence that intermediaries are involved in 
practices inconsistent with public values such as media pluralism. After all, 
technological innovation has abolished content scarcity and abundant media is 
beneficial for all. In a complex ecology it is tall order to underpin claims of market 
distortion or threats to the public interest with a robust evidence base. But multisided 
platform operators package up some content and sell it, and these lines of business are 
used to recover the costs, or to ‘subsidize’ other lines of business, often content. All 
subsidies are not harmful of course, but when they are because they result in reduced 
content diversity, this is when regulatory oversight is needed.  
 
What do the regulator and the public need to know to support a claim that intermediary 
bias and various other practices need to be curtailed? Even if it is judged that the 
exercise of market power is only a theoretical possibility, foresight requires continuing 
attention so that policy makers are not perpetually in reactive mode. Multisided 
platforms enable direct interactions between two or more participant groups. They are 
successful because they reduce searching costs and/or transaction costs for those who 
visit their platform services. This puts them in a privileged position. There is a need for 
vigilance to know how they are deploying this privilege. A key issue is the quality and 
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diversity of content that is produced since, for these platform organizations, there is 
always a trade-off between fostering quantity and quality. However quality is judged it 
is a consideration in view of the goal of protecting the right of citizens to be informed in 
a democracy. It is not possible to map the way companies engaged in platform 
competition are behaving in the old ways by treating them as if they are not platform 
organizations. Legislation and regulation that is geared to measuring media power in 
the old ways simply misses the way the industry is developing. Intermediaries involved 
in platformization are deploying strategies in ways that seek to monopolize segments of 
their markets. There are risks to citizens that need to be curtailed but policy makers will 
have no purchase on the consequences of intermediaries’ strategies if they look in the 
wrong places for symptoms of bad behaviour. When intermediaries close off or steer 
their customers through subscription access to news outlets, for instance, then no 
matter how trustworthy they are, or how much they promise to protect their customers’ 
privacy, they are managing the content that their consumers are most likely to see. 
Platform providers can screen out desirable content without the citizen’s knowledge 
just as they can screen out undesirable content. It should not simply be commercial 
operators that decide what is and is not desirable.  
 
Before the appearance of multisided platforms it was comparatively easy, though not 
uncontroversial, to assess which media content producers and distributors had 
incentives to operate in ways that might limit the plurality of the media environment – 
whether this involved the press or broadcasters. The market concentration of these 
providers could be measured. There was a broad consensus on where to draw 
boundaries around media markets and about what should be measured by a regulator. 
The structural features of platformized markets are continuously changing in ways that 
are not captured in the assumptions in economists’ theoretical models. Policy makers 
must therefore turn to new empirical evidence to determine whether a given market is 
dominated by the very large players in ways that are reducing the diversity of content 
available to citizens.11 This is not only about how the digital spaces citizens encounter 
are structured in the marketplace; it is also about how the activities of these platform 
organisations shape meaning through their capacity to engage in the ‘construction of 
audiences’.12 A key challenge is to work out how to monitor processes that go beyond 
market dynamics and economic incentives. As a result there is a need for a shift in 
thinking ‘from outcomes to processes, to understand how media organizations and 
media users are immersed in algorithmically informed online tools’. 13 Proceeding as if 
there isn’t a ‘new emperor with new clothes’ means that policy decisions about media 
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plurality are being removed from the hands of policy makers. 
 
Negotiating an Evidence-base 
It is not clear that policy makers are ready to catch up with the fast pace of change,14 
although media plurality issues are receiving policy attention. The European 
Commission’s High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism has been very clear 
about what is at stake: ‘In the context of the current economic and financial crisis and 
the steps the European Union has taken to address it, the need for democratic legitimacy 
at the EU level has become an even greater priority’. 15 Its report emphasizes the need 
for adequate monitoring encompassing the whole of the media ecology. It states that 
digital intermediaries such as search engines, news aggregators, and social networks 
should be included in that monitoring. Detailed work has been carried out to design 
media pluralism measures that focus on media supply, distribution and use. 16 So far, 
unfortunately, there is no consensus on how these should be implemented and with 
what force. There is a wide spectrum of views about what would constitute a ‘high’ risk 
of diminishing media pluralism, whether political, cultural or geographical. 
 
In the case of a narrower range of media such as news and current affairs where the link 
between plurality and democracy is self-evident for many policy makers in Europe, 
there are debates about what constitutes ‘sufficient’ plurality. In the UK, Ofcom has been 
developing a methodology that focuses both on content diversity and on the medium 
used to access content, asking citizen audiences to report on their media consumption. 
But it is unclear how often monitoring should take place and what thresholds should 
trigger regulatory intervention. These developments have been criticized for not 
addressing growth dynamics and changes in supplier strategies, for excluding parts of 
the media ecology, for lack of clarity about how to establish diversity standards for 
different types of content, and for the ambiguity around what constitutes ‘sufficient 
plurality’. 17 In the end, all these issues require sensitive political judgements.  
 
Prospects for Effective Regulatory Oversight 
There is some way to go to before a consensus on these issues can be reached in the UK 
and throughout Europe. Collins and Cave are cautious, noting that as steps are taken to 
develop ‘more practicable data-driven ways of assisting judgement’, this will lead to ‘a 
mismatch between the degree of elaboration of the concepts underlying plurality and 
the available data, or to unrealistic expectations about what measurement can do in its 
initial stages’.18 The European Data Protection Supervisor puts the case for action more 
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forcefully, observing that ‘powerful or dominant undertakings are able to exploit 
“economies of aggregation” and create barriers to entry through their control of huge 
personal datasets alongside proprietary software which organises the data’.19 It is of 
course true that intermediaries’ practices are restrained by citizen resistance to the 
more visible actions that they regard as being inconsistent, for instance, with privacy 
protection. Facebook may alter its privacy settings in response. The European Court of 
Justice has mandated that citizens must have a right to have the traces they leave online 
deleted, so Google has set up an Advisory Council to address the right to be forgotten. 
These are sporadic instances of change and they do not tackle the persistent issue of 
judging the plurality of the media. The capacity of platform providers to screen out 
desirable content without the citizen’s knowledge is as significant as their capacity to 
screen out undesirable content. Should platform providers be the sole authorities in 
these matters? Citizens cannot choose to view what they are not aware of or to protest 
about the absence of content which they cannot discover. The regulatory challenge is 
not only about whether platform operators exercise direct editorial control over news 
content, for example. It is also about whether they are shaping citizen’s online 
experience in ways that are consistent with optimizing their revenues - a time-honoured 
strategy, but also inconsistent with fostering a diverse content environment that 
promotes the goal of media plurality.  
 
Regulatory attention needs to shift to the platform arrangements so that intermediaries 
do not establish practices without public oversight. It is tall order to create an evidence 
base to underpin regulatory intervention. In the specific context of news and public 
affairs content, Google and other large intermediaries are not (yet) in the business of 
producing news. This may change and regulators need to be able to monitor the 
emerging control configurations. Instead of focusing on vertical market segments such 
as transmission/access, content, search/aggregation, the focus must move to the new 
points of control. For instance, if a dominant platform operator is screening out some 
news sources, this might trigger regulatory intervention. Large intermediaries have 
access to libraries of digital content, databases capturing platform user preferences and 
habits, and they can finance the copyright license payments to control content. These by 
no means are all new means of monopolisation, but some are and regulators still have a 
preference for focusing on segmented markets. They need to focus on the webs of 
vertical and horizontal, often virtual, linkages. The new emperors have new digital tools 
for exercising their media power, and like their predecessors, these can be used to 
diminish media plurality.  
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A European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) has been set up 
and it is time to ask tough questions about media plurality and what should be done on a 
continuous basis to encourage and sustain it.  Approaches to monitoring both the supply 
and demand side of emerging platformized media markets need to be agreed and 
implemented. The evidence needs to be examined by regulatory authorities regularly. 
The need for normative judgements is not going to disappear. If the media platform 
organisations have the capacity to serve as, for instance, political ‘king-makers’, this 
requires a response before, rather than after, the event.20  
 
Conclusion – Towards Regulatory Innovation 
It is time for regulators to be just as innovative as the digital platform industry. Freedom 
of expression, access to diverse content, and protecting the vulnerable, including 
children, may be secured to some extent by industry self-regulatory codes. But there will 
be times when intermediary gatekeeping has a negative impact on broad public interest 
goals and when this will not be voluntarily addressed by the intermediary companies. 
Proceeding with silo measures of market power and excluding intermediary platform 
operators from public interest regulation is no longer a viable way forward. As Just 
comments, ‘democratic, social and cultural ends are pursued predominantly by content- 
and user-specific objectives, economic goals mostly by objectives related to the 
promotion of competition and market-power control’. 21 Achieving both these goals 
requires a balance, but the intermediaries are not neutral gatekeepers and will not 
become so as a result of market dynamics. Normative consideration of the need for a 
plural media ecology and a vibrant public sphere, consistent with democratic practice, 
must not be sidelined in favour of the economic calculus and audience use indicators 
that never quite make it to a threshold that prompts regulatory intervention.  
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